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Abstract
Mobile Adhoc NETworks (MANETs) are valuable for various applications due to
an efficient, flexible, low-cost and dynamic infrastructure. In these networks, proper
utilization of network resources is desirable to maintain Quality of Service (QoS). In
multi-hop end-to-end communication, intermediate nodes may eavesdrop on data in
transit. As a result, a secured and reliable data delivery from source to destination is
required. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme, known as QASEC, to achieve bet-
ter throughput by securing end-to-end communication in MANETs. The QoS is main-
tained through an optimal link selection from a queue of available transmission links.
The end-to-end communication is secured by authentication. A simple secret-key based
symmetric encryption is deployed for interacting nodes. Our proposed QASEC scheme
prevents the malicious nodes from data exchange with legitimate intermediate nodes
on any established path between the source and the destination. Experimental results
show that QASEC performs better in terms of packet-loss rate, jitter and end-to-end
delay. Furthermore, QASEC is efficient against various attacks and has a much bet-
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1. Introduction
Among the wireless networks, Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) provide in-
frastructureless features and the devices in MANETs can easily move from one place
to another. Unlike a Wi-Fi or a 4G-based transmission system where there is a proper
communication infrastructure and centralized control, multi-hop MANETs pose design
challenges in the faspects of proper bandwidth utilization, Quality of Service (QoS),
power consumption and data confidentiality, due to their distributed and dynamic na-
ture. The mobile nodes in a MANET can join or leave the network at any time, can
set up new links and can affect the data rates of wireless links. The multi-hop commu-
nication also demands time coordination and communication overhead for distributed
control and routing, and cannot ensure the confidentiality of transmitted data over wire-
less links.
To maintain the QoS, the available approaches in literature are usually classified
into two major domains, i.e., bandwidth-reservation-based techniques and best-effort
delivery techniques [1, 2]. In the bandwidth-reservation-based techniques, the band-
width is reserved for specific applications requesting a high and constant bandwidth.
On the other hand, best-effort techniques are suitable for applications where the de-
mands for bandwidths vary from time to time. The elasticity in a bandwidth demand
helps in increasing and in maintaining the QoS of an overall network. The best-effort
techniques mostly use simple and distributed algorithms and are unable to deal with
any applications that demands a constant bandwidth.
Due to highly dynamic nature of a MANET, malicious nodes can easily join and
roam in the network. The malicious nodes can create three major impediments, i.e.,
misuse of transmission links, maliciously manipulating packet transmission and infor-
mation stealing [3, 4, 5, 6]. With the first impediment, a malicious node prevents its
neighbours from getting a fair share of the available bandwidth. Such type of problem
can also be considered as a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, where the transmission
bandwidth is flooded with the garbage data. With the second impediment, the trans-
2
mission of data packets can be disturbed in many ways, such as dropping valid data
packets, delaying of packet transmission, creating routing loops and spoofing. With
the third impediment, the malicious node modifies the routing tables, directs traffic to
unknown destinations, and can even lead to severe consequences, such as misuse of
personal data.
In this paper, we consider a QoS-Aware Secured End-to-End data Communica-
tion (QASEC) in MANETs. The QoS is ensured by selecting an optimal transmission
link to maintain a smooth data transmission between source and destination nodes.
For a secured data delivery from the source to destination nodes, each node along the
transmission link is authenticated. As a result, the malicious nodes are barred from
communication along the transmission path. The main contributions of QASEC are as
follows.
• We propose a simple and lightweight scheme to select the best link among the
available transmission links from source toward the destination nodes, based on
the current network status. The selection of an optimal transmission link helps in
efficient utilization of available bandwidth and minimization of end-to-end de-
lay. To improve QoS, end-to-end response time and available bandwidth are es-
timated to evaluate the consumption of available bandwidth by the sender nodes.
This evaluation enables the sender nodes to adjust their data transmission rates.
• To ensure a secured transmission over an infrastructureless and unreliable MANET,
a simple authentication handshake mechanism is proposed. The proposed mech-
anism relies on symmetric encryption using shared secret keys and identity of
each device for authentication.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Relevant literature is summarized
in Section II. The proposed QoS-aware end-to-end secured communication scheme is
discussed in Section III. In Section IV, experimental setup and results are discussed.
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V.
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2. Literature Review
In this section, the related works from MANET pertaining to QASEC are presented.
First, we provide Quality of Service (QoS) related literature in Section 2.1 followed by
security provisioning in Section 2.2.
2.1. Quality of Service
A survey on hybrid routing protocols for MANETs was presented in [7]. This
survey explains the four categories, i.e., mesh, tree, zone and multi-path, of hybrid
routing mechanisms along with their performances. Another similar survey for routing
protocols based on link-stability for MANETs was presented in [8]. In their survey,
the routing protocols are classified based on link stability and mobility support and
are explained with examples. A survey on structured Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architecture
over MANETs was presented in [9]. This survey identifies approaches in terms of P2P
systems and MANET underlay systems, and summarizes their performances. In order
to provide the QoS mechanism during the routing process, a feedback-based routing
protocol was proposed to support scalable video streaming over MANETs [10]. The
proposed protocol helped in reducing the congestion in MANETs and in maintaining a
better quality of received videos. However, the feedback introduced a communication
overhead with an increasing number of relay nodes. To maintain QoS in MANETs,
both delay and network interference were considered to control the network topology
[11]. This approach could help in improving the performance of delay-constrained
MANETs but at the cost of reducing transmission range. A multi-cast routing proto-
col was combined with network coding to meet the bandwidth requirement in lossy
MANETs [12]. This protocol reduced the total bandwidth consumption and guaran-
teed the bandwidth availability to a requested flow but at the cost of overhead of control
packets. To support the VoIP transmission in MANETs, a distributed application and
a network layer protocol was proposed in [13]. To maintain the QoS level for VoIP
transmission, the protocol helped in selecting the best path between the source and the
destination nodes. However, due to insufficient power of mobile devices, it could not
support a long range communication. Cuckoo-search-based QoS routing for MANETs
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was proposed in [14]. The proposed scheme satisfied the QoS constraint with better
routing metrics. However, heavy computational load made this scheme unsuitable for
light processing mobile devices.
2.2. Security
Similar to other wireless networks, communication over MANETs is made via ra-
dio waves. As a result, an intruder or a malicious entity can eavesdrop on commu-
nication in transit. Communication among the nodes, outside the radio range of each
other, is relayed by intermediate nodes, which may further expose the network to var-
ious types of attacks. Trust among the nodes in a MANET is achieved via a web of
trust model [15]. In this model, the nodes create their own public and private keys
and establish trust relationships among themselves, in a self-organizing fashion. This
model can be classified into two types: certificate-based model and reputation-based
model. In the former model, trust is established based on the observed behaviours of
participant entities within a network [16]. The latter is a simple model in which trust
among the nodes is based on a central Trusted Third Party (TTP), which is responsible
for ensuring trust among the nodes within the same authority domain. In a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), the TTP is responsible to act as a Certificate Authority (CA), a
trusted entity responsible for issuing, verifying and revoking of digital certificates. In
[17], the authors proposed a PKI-based approach for MANET. The proposed work is
based on threshold cryptography for distributing the role of the CA among the com-
municating nodes. The secret key of the CA is distributed among all the nodes within
the network for certificate signature. The proposed work is vulnerable to mobile ad-
versary attacks when the number of malicious nodes exceed the threshold limit set by
the cryptographic approach. In [18], an on-demand public key management protocol
was proposed for the self-organized nodes within MANETs. Instead of certificates, the
proposed protocol relies on public keys generated by the nodes. In the absence of the
CA, the self-generated public keys are less trustworthy and they affect the reliability
and authenticity of the proposed protocol. In MANETs, public key authentication can
be achieved using certificates or an ID-based approach, which is not the case with the
proposed protocol of [18]. An on-demand routing protocol was proposed by authors
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in [19]. To authenticate a particular node, a certificate chain was established towards
it. Although, the proposed protocol reduced the storage requirements, it incurred a
high communication overhead that increases exponentially with the number of hops
towards the target node. In [20], the authors proposed a secured and efficient algo-
rithm, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Instead of using a trusted third
party for certificate generation, the proposed approach was a self-certified ID-based
public key approach for distributed MANETs. The proposed approach was efficient in
terms of computational costs, communication and storage, involved during encryption.
3. QoS-Aware Secured End-to-End Data Communication
In this section, we define a data transmission model (i.e., QASEC) for MANETs.
This model is divided into two sections, i.e., the sections describing a QoS model and
an authentication framework for malicious nodes detection, respectively.
3.1. Quality of Service Model
In this section, few assumptions are first discussed. Then, a routing model is pro-
posed and explained to ensure the QoS in end-to-end data communication in MANETs.
3.1.1. Assumptions
In the QoS model, we consider a MANET consisting ofN nodes and L links. Each
link represents a connection between two nodes within the transmission range of each
other. The nodes are assumed to be synchronized for transmission, congestion con-
trol and packet scheduling. The transmission parameters help in determining a set of
available transmission links and mode of transmission. The packet scheduling helps
in selecting a suitable transmission link from the set of available links. Congestion
control, on the other hand, calculates the rate of incoming data traffic. It is also as-
sumed that, within a transmission range, a node can perform multiple transmissions or
receptions from multiple nodes, simultaneously. Let us assume that each source node
s ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, maintains a set of its available transmission links and selects the
best transmission link, also known as primary link, for data transmission to the destina-
tion node d, where d ∈ {1, 2 · · · , N}. Each node has a unique ID and we assume that
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the nodes exchange identification messages with each other at regular time intervals.
Each identification message contains the sender node ID and its location information.
It is assumed that the data rate is never zero between the source and destination nodes
when the source and destination nodes are different. The data rate is a time-dependent
factor and is readjusted by the contention window of d from time to time. At time t, the
maximum possible traffic on a transmission link to a specific destination d is denoted
by Ls,d(t).
3.1.2. Routing Model
Geographical routing or position-based routing is commonly used in wireless net-
works. The position-based routing uses either face-based routing or greedy routing or
a combination of these two routing algorithms [21]. Greedy routing utilizes the lo-
cal information of the network to deliver data packets to the destination. This routing
scheme, also known as table-driven routing, maintains the routing tables. Our routing
model is also based on the table-driven routing principles. As the nodes are mobile,
it is possible that they may be moving constantly from one geographical location to
another. A source node s selects an available transmission link as a primary link, only
if the link represents the minimum distance to the destination or to the next hop and
offers maximum bandwidth. Remaining links from the set of available transmission
links are considered as backup links. Due to mobility, current primary link may not be
optimal to use for further transmissions, after certain time. In this case, a new transmis-
sion link from the backup links needs to be selected as the primary link. Furthermore,
the mobility will bring new nodes within the transmission range of each other, and the
set of available transmission links needs to be modified and updated, instantaneously.
This modification procedure will eliminate the old transmission links and will add new
available transmission links.
If a link is select as the primary link at time t, then the node swill get the maximum




The capacity of a wireless link (i.e., ε) between the source and destination nodes in





where, εz is the capacity of z-th consecutive transmission link from the source and
destination nodes in a link consisting of Z-hops.
The available bandwidth of the z-th transmission link in an interval of time (t−λ, t],
can be estimated as follows.







Here, θz(t) represents the instantaneous utilization of the z-th transmission link at time
t and λ is the time shift.
The end-to-end available bandwidth between the source and destination nodes at





Eqs. 2- 3 and Eq. 5, can be used for a general representation of the link capacity and
the available bandwidth but may not be compatible with different network conditions.
In the case of MANETs, the transmission links are usually shared and unreliable. In
that situation, we compute six parameters, i.e., link capacity, end-to-end capacity, link
bandwidth, end-to-end bandwidth, estimated time to transmit one data packet on a
transmission link and estimated time to transmit all the data packets in the end-to-end
communication.
Between any pair of nodes within the transmission range of each other, the trans-
mission link capacity can be defined as the maximum transmission bit-rate of the trans-
mitting node. There may be multiple transmission links between any pair of nodes but
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no more than one link can be used simultaneously. If each network resource is available
between the source and destination nodes, then the time (i.e., T ) required to transmit a
Y -bit long packet from the source to destination nodes on an available z-th transmis-







To control saturation of the link, there must be a time gap between the transmission
of consecutive data packets. Let us denote this time gap by Tg , where
Tg << T. (7)
Now, the maximum transmission rate on an available z-th transmission link can be







The end-to-end capacity of a multi-hop transmission link can be estimated using
Eq. 2.
When the transmission channel is completely available and there is no competing
node, then the time required to access and ultimately release the transmission link in
a one-hop communication can be defined by a random variable r. In this case, the
bandwidth of the z-th link can be computed by Eq. 9.
Bz =
ε× Y
Y + ε× r
. (9)
If the transmission rate is ε bits per second and the data packet is Y -bit long, then






Under an ideal scheduling scheme, the average time (i.e., r) required to transmit


















In a network of multiple transmission links, the z-th link can transmit P packets at
time t. The P includes all the transmitted data packets and control packets on a link
forwarded by all the sources sharing the link. The estimated time (i.e., T ) to transmit
all the data packets in a multi-hop communication can be computed using Eq. 13.
E[T ] = T × P. (13)
3.2. Mutual Authentication Framework
In this section, we propose an efficient authentication framework for mobile nodes,
interacting in a MANET environment. The frequent topological changes within the
network require a dynamic approach for securing communication among the nodes.
Therefore, each incoming node needs to authenticate itself before participating in net-
work communication. Like any other network, compromising the nodes within a
MANET is a severe type of attack and each node needs an adequate level of secu-
rity to ensure reliable transmission of data. Our approach uses symmetric encryption
and it consists of two main phases: Configuration Phase and Authentication Phase.
During the configuration phase, each node is configured and provided with its own
identity (α), a unique session key (δ) and an authentication token (∆). It is important
to mention here that α is hard-coded on each node and remains unchanged throughout
the network lifetime. In our scheme, α, δ and ∆ are 128-bits each. During the con-
figuration phase, all nodes are configured offline at the time of network deployment.
Each node, be it an already deployed node or an incoming node to the network, has
knowledge about the identities of the legitimate nodes.
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During the authentication phase, the nodes initiate mutual authentication which
enable them to validate the identities of their neighboring nodes. This phase consists
of four simple steps. In the first step, a node i, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, generates a
request message Ri by appending αi with t1, as shown in Eq. 14.
Ri = M [αi, t1]. (14)
where t1 is the assigned time stamp.
Each node broadcasts a request and assumes it to be acknowledged within a spec-
ified time period. The Ri message is usually acknowledged by one-hop neighboring
nodes of node i. In the second step, node j, where j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, receives Ri and
retrieves αi from it. Here, node j is a one-hop neighbour of node i and (i 6= j). After
retrieving αi fromRi, node j checks its own database for a matching ∆i. The presence
of αi means that node i is a legitimate node. At this point, node j retrieves ∆i from its
own database and creates an encrypted response Rj for node i, as shown in Eq. 15.
Rj = M [∆i, (∆i ⊕ δj)|µj , t2]. (15)
In Eq. 15, Rj is created by node j while encrypting µj and δj with ∆i. Here, µj
is a pseudo-random nonce, a temporary number used only once by a node during the
entire authentication process. In this equation, δj is a secret session key generated by
node j. The exclusive-OR operation on ∆i and δj generates a 128-bit result which is
appended with µj to produce a 256-bit Rj . Besides ∆i, node j also retrieves t1 from
Ri and attaches a new time stamp t2 to Rj . The node i expects to fetch a response
within the duration of its allocated time stamp t1. An intruder node would require
2128 attempts to generate Rj in absence of a valid ∆i. The security can be enhanced
further if αi is of a larger size. The presence of time stamp within Ri means that
node i is expecting a response sooner and an intruder may not have sufficient time to
provide a valid response. Finally, the message is encrypted with ∆i and broadcasts to
the neighboring nodes.
In the third step, node i receivesRj from node j and retrieves the encrypted param-
eters. At this point, node i uses its ∆i to decrypt Rj . Only a legitimate node having
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a valid ∆i can decrypt Rj . Here, node i retrieves δj and stores in its own database.
Furthermore, it gains access to µj and checks t2. It then calculates the difference (i.e.,
t =t1-t2) and checks if t is within the specified time period. If that is the case, it means
that Rj is received from a legitimate node. At this point, node i generates its own
encrypted response Ri, as shown in Eq. 16.
Ri = M [δj , (∆i ⊕ µj)|µi, t3]. (16)
In Eq. 16, node i creates an encrypted response Ri and sends it back to node j.
First, an exclusive-OR operation is performed on ∆i and µj and the result is appended
with µi. In this case, µi is a 128-bit pseudo-random nonce generated by node i. Finally,
the result is encrypted with δj , and sends it back to node j with a new time stamp t3.
The receiver needs to acknowledge Ri within the duration specified by t3.
In the fourth step, node j deciphers Ri of node i to observe µj in it. If present, the
node j realizes that node i has successfully authenticated itself because only a legiti-
mate node can provide µj . At this point, both the nodes have successfully exchanged
δj without any tampering. The node j retrieves µi and creates an acknowledgment Aj
as shown in Eq. 17.
Aj = M [∆i, (µi|δj)]. (17)
In Eq. 17, node j appends µi with δj and encrypts with ∆i. The 256-bit encrypted
Aj is transmitted over the wireless link. Any nearby node can receives this encrypted
message, however, only one particular node that possesses a valid δj , can decrypt Aj .
Apart from δj , the receiver needs to have a valid µi and ∆i to understand Aj . In this
case, only node i satisfies the required conditions. Upon reception, this node decrypts
Aj and observe µi in it. At this point, node j has also authenticated itself because it
has provided with node i’s generated µi. Furthermore, both nodes have access to the
same δj that is used for data transmission among them.
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4. Experimental Setup and Simulation Results
In this section, first we explain the simulation environment for our proposed QASEC.
Next, we analyze the performance of QASEC in terms of QoS in Section 4.2, followed
by security consideration in Section 4.3.
4.1. Network Simulation Setup
We use Matlab for network simulation. In our experiments, 1000 mobile nodes are
randomly deployed in an area of 2000 × 2000 m2. Due to such a large scale network,
the Matlab takes a significant amount of time to execute the simulation. The wireless
communication is based on IEEE 802.11 standard and the transmission range of each
mobile node is set to 100 m. The multi-path transmission helps in reducing the com-
putational load on the hops. The mobile nodes move with a speed of 1m/s and change
their positions after every 60 seconds. The simulations run on a system with Core
i5, 3.30 GHz processing unit and 16GB RAM. The total number of data generating
sources can be either fixed or variable. In our simulations, we fix the data generating
sources to 150. We execute the simulation for three times to monitor the performance
of our proposed QASEC scheme. Overall, the simulation runs for more than 10 hours
due to the large scale of network.
4.2. Quality of Service Analysis
In our proposed routing scheme, nodes maintain a table of all the available trans-
mission links to the destination. Therefore, we compare its performance with other
table-driven routing protocols, such as Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol
[22] and Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV) protocol [23]. These routing
protocols are standard routing protocols in MANETs [24, 25, 26]. The comparison is
performed based on different metrics, such as end-to-end delay, jitter, packet-loss rate
and total number of control packets. The experiments are performed under constant
bit-rate scenario, i.e., each data packet has the same size. Fig. 1 shows a comparison
of the end-to-end delay for 150 data generating sources. Due to the selection of the
optimum link, the end-to-end delay of our proposed routing scheme is lower than the
OLSR and DSDV protocols.
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Figure 1: Packet-loss rate vs. Number of source nodes
The selection of the optimum link also helps in reducing the jitter as shown in
Fig. 2. In MANETs, the end-to-end delay and jitter increase with an increase in the
number of hops between the source and destination nodes. Packet-loss by the hops
requires retransmission of the data packets and is very common in the constant bit-rate
scenario. The drop of the data packets has a direct relationship with the end-to-end
delay as shown in Fig. 3. A higher ratio of packet-loss increases the end-to-end delay.
Figure 2: Jitter vs. Number of source nodes
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Figure 3: Packet loss rate vs. End-to-end delay (ms)
Backup of multiple transmission paths help in efficiently utilizing the network re-
sources. Due to the increasing ratio of packet-drop, more retransmission attempts are
required. These retransmission attempts increase the network traffic and consume a
sufficient amount of bandwidth. More retransmission attempts also degrade the QoS.
Finally, the control packets are monitored. Our proposed routing scheme continuously
monitors the status of the network and updates the tables of available transmission
links. In the table-driven routing, the mobile nodes share the routing tables with each
other. Therefore, the overhead of control packets is almost the same in our proposed
routing scheme when compared with OLSR and DSDV protocols, as shown in Fig. 4.
4.3. Security Analysis
In our proposed authentication framework, we use symmetric encryption in which
secret keys and identification tokens are used to secure the exchange of data. We use
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a key length of 128 bits in Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode to generate various requests and responses of authentication.
AES-128 in CBC mode is extremely lightweight for resource-constrained nodes and
incurs less computational overhead on each node. To verify the authenticity and in-
tegrity of messages, we use cipher block chaining in CBC-MAC mode. In this section,
we analyze various performance metrics to evaluate our proposed security scheme.
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Figure 4: Number of control packets vs. Number of hops
4.3.1. Key Generation Cost
In Table 1, the cost associated with key generation for various schemes is shown.
In the case of the existing works proposed in [20] and [19], a lot of resources are con-
sumed in terms of timing and energy consumption. In [20], ECC-based operations
are performed, whereas in [19], certificates are generated. Both these operations con-
sume a significant among of time and energy during keys generation. In our proposed
scheme, the session key is generated instantly once a match is found with the device
identity, within the stored database. As a result, our proposed scheme performs much
better in terms of timing and energy consumption.
Table 1: Key Generation Cost
Operation Costs Timing (ms) Energy (mj)
Gharb et al. [20] 738.27 226.65
Dahshaen et al. [19] 1384.27 1150.55
Proposed Scheme 257.49 199.23
4.3.2. Encryption Cost
In Table 2, the encryption cost of our proposed scheme is compared against the
existing schemes of [20] and [19]. In these schemes, resource-intensive operations
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are performed during the encryption. As a result, they incur much higher cost. In
our scheme, a simple handshake mechanism is initiated, once a match is found for
the device identity. In terms of timing, our proposed scheme takes only 102.1 ms
to complete the mutual handshake between the communicating nodes, on a specific
path. The lightweight handshaking approach of our scheme consumes only 119.3 mJ
of energy. Please note that the encryption cost does not include the cost associated with
the first step of our proposed scheme. This is because this step only aims to generate a
key at the receiver end.
Table 2: Encryption Cost
Operation Costs Timing (ms) Energy (mJ)
Gharb et al. [20] 151.4 134.2
Dahshaen et al. [19] 364.8 513.8
Proposed Scheme 102.1 119.3
4.3.3. Storage and Communication Costs
In Table 3, a comparison is made with the existing schemes in terms of storage re-
quirement and communication overhead costs. When the number of nodes is 100 and
the path length is 10, the existing scheme of [20] requires a storage capacity of 6.09 KB
and has a communication overhead of 22.19 MB. For the same number of nodes and
path length, [19] has a storage requirement of 10 KB and a communication overhead
of 88.95 MB. The ECC-based operation of [20] and the certificate-based operations of
[19] incur higher storage and communication costs. Unlike the existing schemes, our
proposed approach does not require the exchange of certificates and complex encryp-
tion. As a result, it has less storage and communication costs.
Table 3: Storage and Communication Costs
Operation Costs Storage (KB) Communication (MB)
Gharb et al. [20] 6.09 22.19
Dahshaen et al. [19] 10 88.95
Proposed Scheme 3.77 16.25
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a framework (i.e., QASEC) for QoS-aware se-
cured end-to-end data communication in MANETs. The QoS has been improved by
selecting the optimal transmission links between the source and destination nodes. The
optimal link has been selected, based on the available bandwidth and response time
for an end-to-end communication. Besides QoS-aware routing, we have proposed a
simple end-to-end secured communication framework for the nodes along a particular
path towards the destination. The proposed approach engages the neighboring nodes
to authenticate themselves. A simple handshake mechanism is deployed to validate the
identities of communicating entities. In the experimental results, our proposed routing
scheme have shown better performance as compared to the standard table-driven rout-
ing protocols in terms of packet loss rate, jitter and end-to-end delay. The experimental
results also have proved that the proposed authentication scheme has performed better
than the existing authentication schemes based on various associated costs, such as key
generation, authentication, and storage and communication.
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